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Abstract
Let A be a ﬁnite set of m alternatives, let N be a ﬁnite set of n players and let RN be
a proﬁle of linear preference orderings on A of the players. Let uN be a proﬁle of utility
functions for RN. We deﬁne the NTU game VuN that corresponds to simple majority voting,
and investigate its Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell bargaining sets.
The ﬁrst bargaining set is nonempty for m · 3 and it may be empty for m ¸ 4. However,
in a simple probabilistic model, for ﬁxed m, the probability that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler
bargaining set is nonempty tends to one if n tends to inﬁnity.
The Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty for m · 5 and it may be empty for m ¸ 6.
Furthermore, it may be empty even if we insist that n be odd, provided that m is suﬃciently
large. Nevertheless, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of any simple majority voting
game derived from the k-th replication of RN is nonempty, provided that k ¸ n + 2.
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The Voting Paradox prevents us from applying the majority voting rule to choice problems
with more than two alternatives. The standard way to avoid the paradox is to assume that
the preferences of the voters are restricted so that the method of decision by majority yields
no cycles (see Gaertner (2001) for a recent comprehensive survey). In this paper we follow a
diﬀerent path. It is well-known that the Voting Paradox is equivalent to the emptiness of the
core of the corresponding cooperative majority voting game. We investigate two bargaining sets
which contain the core.
We shall now review our results. At the end of the review we shall present our main conclusions.
In Section 2 we derive the exact form of the cooperative NTU games which correspond to simple
majority voting.1 We also recall the deﬁnitions of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Mas-Colell
bargaining sets of cooperative NTU games.
The Voting Paradox with three voters and three alternatives is analyzed in Section 3 with respect
to these two bargaining sets.
Section 4 addresses the existence question for the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set of
a simple majority voting game. We show that it is nonempty when there are at most three
alternatives, but may be empty when there are four or more alternatives.
The same question for the Mas-Colell bargaining set is addressed in Section 5. It turns out that
the boundary between existence and non-existence is somewhat higher in this case: We prove
existence for up to ﬁve alternatives, and give examples of emptiness for six or more alternatives.
In these examples, there is an even number of voters. This raises the question, addressed in
Section 6, of whether the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a simple majority voting game with an
odd number of voters may be empty. This indeed turns out to be the case, but showing this
requires a much more elaborate construction and huge numbers of alternatives and voters.
We conclude in Section 7 with existence results for two models in which there are many voters,
whose preferences are drawn in a speciﬁed way. In one of them, a simple probabilistic model,
we show that both bargaining sets are nonempty with probability tending to one as the number
of voters tends to inﬁnity. In the other, a replication model, we prove that the Mas-Colell
bargaining set is nonempty for any k-fold replication with k suﬃciently large.
An individually rational payoﬀ vector belongs to the bargaining set if (i) it is (weakly) Pareto
optimal and (ii) for every objection (in the sense of the bargaining set under consideration) there
1Similar derivations may be carried out for other voting rules. Here we concentrate on the most natural voting
rule, simple majority. We refer the reader to an earlier version of this manuscript (available as Discussion Paper
# 376, Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) for a treatment of plurality
voting and approval voting.
2is a counter objection. Our study proves that the tension between (i) and (ii) is so strong that
for six or more alternatives both bargaining sets may be empty. This is our ﬁrst conclusion.
Our second conclusion is more vague: If the number of players tends to inﬁnity and the number
of alternatives is held ﬁxed, then the bargaining sets of simple majority voting games are likely
to be nonempty.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1;:::;ng, n ¸ 2, be a set of voters, also called players, and let A = fa1;:::;amg,
m ¸ 2, be a set of m alternatives. For S µ N we denote by RS the set of all real functions on
S. So RS is the jSj-dimensional Euclidean space. (Here and in the sequel, if D is a ﬁnite set,
then jDj denotes the cardinality of D.) If x;y 2 RS, then we write x ¸ y if xi ¸ yi for all i 2 S.
Moreover, we write x > y if x ¸ y and x 6= y and we write x À y if xi > yi for all i 2 S. Denote
RS
+ = fx 2 RS j x ¸ 0g. A set C µ RS is comprehensive if x 2 C, y 2 RS, and y · x imply
that y 2 C. An NTU game with the player set N is a pair (N;V ) where V is a function which
associates with every coalition S (that is, S µ N and S 6= ;) a set V (S) µ RS, V (S) 6= ;, such
that
(1) V (S) is closed and comprehensive;
(2) V (S) \ (x + RS
+) is bounded for every x 2 RS.
We shall now assume that each i 2 N has a linear preference Ri on A. Thus, for every i 2 N,
Ri is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on A. Moreover, let ui, i 2 N,
be a utility function that represents Ri. We shall always assume that
min
®2A
ui(®) = 0 for all i 2 N: (2.1)
We consider a situation in which every player votes for some alternative in A. If a strict
majority of voters agrees on ® 2 A, then the outcome is ®, and every voter i gets utility ui(®).
Otherwise, if no majority forms, a deadlock results and every voter gets utility 0. Given any
utility proﬁle uN = (ui)i2N that satisﬁes (2.1), this naturally leads (via ®-eﬀectiveness) to the
following deﬁnition of the NTU game (N;VuN) associated with choice by simple majority voting
and called simple majority voting game (see Aumann (1967)):








where uS(®) = (ui(®))i2S.
3Notation 2.1 In the sequel let L = L(A) denote the set of linear preferences on A. For R 2 L
and for k 2 f1;:::;mg, let tk(R) denote the k-th alternative in the order R. If RN 2 LN and
®;¯ 2 A, ® 6= ¯, then ® dominates ¯ (abbreviated ® Â RN ¯) if jfi 2 N j ® Ri ¯gj > n
2: We shall
say that an alternative ® 2 A is a weak Condorcet winner (with respect to RN) if ¯ 6Â RN ® for
all ¯ 2 A. Also, if RN 2 LN, then denote
URN
= f(ui)i2N j ui is a representation of Ri satisfying (2.1) 8i 2 Ng:
Let (N;V ) be an NTU game. The pair (N;V ) is zero-normalized if V (fig) = ¡R
fig
+ for all i 2 N.
Also, (N;V ) is superadditive if for every pair of disjoint coalitions S;T, V (S)£V (T) µ V (S[T).
It should be remarked that the NTU games deﬁned by (2.2) and (2.3) are zero-normalized and
superadditive.
Now we shall recall the deﬁnitions of two bargaining sets introduced by Davis and Maschler
(1967) and by Mas-Colell (1989), following the general approach delineated by Aumann and
Maschler (1964). Let (N;V ) be a zero-normalized NTU game and x 2 RN. We say that x is
² individually rational if x ¸ 0;
² Pareto optimal (in V (N)) if x 2 V (N) and if y 2 V (N) and y ¸ x imply x = y;
² weakly Pareto optimal (in V (N)) if x 2 V (N) and if for every y 2 V (N) there exists i 2 N
such that xi ¸ yi;
² a preimputation if x is weakly Pareto optimal in V (N);
² an imputation if x is an individually rational preimputation.
We also use the natural analogue of the Pareto optimality notion with respect to V (S), where
; 6= S µ N.
A pair (P;y) is an objection at x if ; 6= P µ N, y is Pareto optimal in V (P), and y > xP.
An objection (P;y) is strong if y À xP. The pair (Q;z) is a weak counter objection to the
objection (P;y) if Q µ N, Q 6= ;;P, if z 2 V (Q), and if z ¸ (yP\Q;xQnP). A weak counter
objection (Q;z) is a counter objection to the objection (P;y) if z > (yP\Q;xQnP). A strong
objection (P;y) is justiﬁed in the sense of the bargaining set if there exist players k 2 P and
` 2 N n P such that there does not exist any weak counter objection (Q;z) to (P;y) satisfying
` 2 Q and k = 2 Q. The bargaining set of (N;V ), M(N;V ), is the set of all imputations x that
do not have strong justiﬁed objections at x in the sense of the bargaining set (see Davis and
Maschler (1967)). An objection (P;y) is justiﬁed in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
if there does not exist any counter objection to (P;y). The Mas-Colell bargaining set of (N;V ),
MB(N;V ), is the set of all imputations x that do not have a justiﬁed objection at x in the sense
of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (see Mas-Colell (1989)).
4Remark 2.2 The original deﬁnition of Mas-Colell considered preimputations, not just imputa-
tions. In restricting our attention to imputations we follow Vohra (1991). In any case, all our
results about existence and non-existence are valid for both variants of the deﬁnition.
Remark 2.3 For a given RN 2 LN, the particular choice of a representation uN 2 URN
is
essentially immaterial: diﬀerent representations lead to NTU games that are derived from each
other by ordinal transformations, and so are their bargaining sets.
3 The Voting Paradox
In this section we shall compute the bargaining sets of the Voting Paradox and interpret the
results.
Let A = fa;b;cg, let n = 3, and let RN 2 LN be given by Table 3.1.





For i 2 N let ui be a utility representation of Ri satisfying (2.1) and let V = VuN (see (2.2) and
(2.3)).
We claim that M(N;V ) = f0g. Indeed, it is straightforward to verify that 0 2 M(N;V ). In
order to show the opposite inclusion let x 2 M(N;V ). Then there exists ® 2 A such that
x · uN(®). Without loss of generality we may assume that ® = a. Assume, on the contrary,
that x > 0. If x1 > 0, then (f2;3g;uf2;3g(c)) is a justiﬁed objection of 3 against 1 at x in the
sense of the bargaining set. If x1 = 0 and, hence, x2 > 0, then (f1;3g;uf1;3g(b)) is a justiﬁed
objection of 1 against 2.
In order to compute the Mas-Colell bargaining set, we deﬁne x = (u1(b);u2(a);0) and claim that
x 2 MB(N;V ). Indeed, let (P;y) be an objection at x. Then jPj ¸ 2. As y is Pareto optimal in
V (P), y 2 fuP(®) j ® 2 Ag. If y = uP(a), then (P;y) is countered by (f2;3g;uf2;3g(c)). If y =
uP(b), then y > xP implies that P = f1;3g. In this case (P;y) is countered by (f1;2g;uf1;2g(a)).
Finally, if y = uP(c), then y > xP implies that P = f2;3g and that (P;y) is countered by
(f1;3g;uf1;3g(b)).
5In order to show that every ˆ x 2 RN satisfying 0 · ˆ x · x is an element of MB(N;V ), it
should be noted that each objection at ˆ x is also an objection at x if ˆ x1 > 0 and ˆ x2 > 0. If
ˆ x1 = 0 and ˆ x2 > 0, then the additional objections are of the form (P;uP(c)) for some P µ N
and these objections can be countered by (f1;3g;uf1;3g(b)). Similarly, if ˆ x1 > 0 and ˆ x2 = 0,
then the additional objections can be countered by (f1;2g;uf1;2g(a)). Finally, if ˆ x = 0, then
each additional objection can be countered by one of the foregoing pairs (f1;3g;uf1;3g(b)) or
(f1;2g;uf1;2g(a)).
Similarly, for y = (u1(b);0;u3(c)) and z = (0;u2(a);u3(c)) we have that every ˆ y 2 RN satisfying
0 · ˆ y · y and every ˆ z 2 RN satisfying 0 · ˆ z · z is in MB(N;V ).
We shall show now that there are no other elements in MB(N;V ). Indeed, any remaining indi-
vidually rational e x 2 V (N) must have a coordinate that is higher than the utility of that voter’s
second best alternative. Say, without loss of generality, that e x1 > u1(b). Then (f2;3g;uf2;3g(c))
is a justiﬁed objection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set at e x. We conclude that
MB(N;V ) is the intersection of RN
+ and the comprehensive hull of fx;y;zg.
Discussion: The singleton M(N;V ) tells us that in order to achieve (coalitional) stability the
players have to give up any proﬁt above their individually protected levels of utility. There
is no hint how an alternative of A will be chosen. The message of MB(N;V ) is much more
detailed. For example, the element x = (u1(b);u2(a);0) tells us that the alternative a may be
chosen provided player 1 disposes of u1(a)¡u1(b) utiles. Thus, we also see here that lower utility
levels guarantee stability. Actually, x implies that there is an agreement between 1 and 2, the
alternative a is chosen as a result of the agreement, and the utility of 1 is reduced (because of
the agreement) from u1(a) to u1(b). Note that cooperative game theory does not specify the
details of agreements that support stable payoﬀ vectors.
In this example (and indeed in many other examples) the Mas-Colell bargaining set is much
larger than the Aumann-Davis-Maschler one. However, it is intersting to note that MB(N;V )
need not contain M(N;V ) in general, as shown by the following example.
Example 3.1 Let n = 4 and let RN be given by Table 3.2.
Then x = (minfui(b);ui(a)g)i2N 2 M(N;V ); because there is no strong objection at x. How-
ever, x = 2 MB(N;V ) because (N;uN(a)) is a justiﬁed objection in the sense of the Mas-Colell
bargaining set at x.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that when the number of alternatives is three and there is no weak
Condorcet winner, then in the associated NTU game (N;V ) we have M(N;V ) µ MB(N;V ).2
2We refer the reader to an earlier version of this manuscript (available as Discussion Paper # 376, Center for
the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem), where this fact is derived from a detailed (though
incomplete) description of the bargaining sets of simple majority voting games in the case of three alternatives.
6Table 3.2: Preference Proﬁle of a 4-Person Voting Problem
R1 R2 R3 R4
a a c c
b b b b
c c a a
4 The Bargaining Set
Throughout this section let RN 2 L(A)N, Â = Â RN, uN 2 URN
(see Notation 2.1), V = VuN
(see (2.2) and (2.3)).
Theorem 4.1 If jAj · 3, then M(N;V ) 6= ;.
Proof: If there exists a weak Condorcet winner ® 2 A, then uN(®) 2 M(N;V ). So we may
assume that jAj = 3 and for every ® 2 A there exists ¯ 2 A such that ¯ Â ®. We claim that for
any ® 2 A there exists i 2 N such that t3(Ri) = ®. Indeed, if ® 2 ft1(Ri);t2(Ri)g for all i 2 N
and if ¯ Â ®, then jfi 2 N j ¯ = t1(Ri)gj > n
2 and ¯ is a Condorcet winner which was excluded.
We conclude that 0 2 RN is weakly Pareto optimal. Hence 0 2 M(N;V ). q.e.d.
Example 4.2 Let A = fa;b;c;dg, let n = 3, and let RN be given by Table 4.1.






We claim that M(N;V ) = ;. Let x be an imputation of (N;V ). In order to show that
x = 2 M(N;V ) we may assume without loss of generality that x1 ¸ u1(d). We distinguish the
following possibilities:




is a justiﬁed objection (in the sense of
the bargaining set) of 3 against 1.
(2) x · uN(b). If x3 < u3(c), then we may use the same justiﬁed strong objection as in the




is a justiﬁed objection of 2 against
3.
Example 4.2 shows the tension between (weak) Pareto optimality and stability may result in an
empty bargaining set.
Example 4.2 may be generalized to any number m ¸ 4 of alternatives. Indeed, let A =




and note that M(N;V ) = ;. More interestingly, Example 4.2 can be generalized to yield an
empty bargaining set for simple majority voting games on four alternatives with inﬁnitely many
numbers of voters.
Example 4.3 (Example 4.2 generalized) Let
R1 = (a;b;d;c); R2 = (a;c;d;b); R3 = (b;a;d;c);
R4 = (b;c;d;a); R5 = (c;a;d;b); R6 = (c;b;d;a);
and let k 2 N. Let N = f1;:::;6k ¡ 3g and let RN 2 LN satisfy




k , if i = 1;4;5;
k ¡ 1 , if i = 2;3;6:
Then M(N;V ) = ;. Indeed, k = 1 coincides with Example 4.2. The reader may check e.g. the
case k = 2 (see Table 4.2) by repeating the arguments of Example 4.2.
5 The Mas-Colell Bargaining Set
We shall show that MB is nonempty for any simple majority voting game on less than six
alternatives. Also, we shall show that there is a simple majority voting game on six alterna-
tives whose Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty. We shall always assume that RN 2 L(A)N,
Â = Â RN, uN 2 URN
, and V = VuN. We start with the following simple lemma.
8Table 4.2: Preference Proﬁle for k = 2
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9
a a b b c c a c b
b c a c a b b a c
d d d d d d d d d
c b c a b a c b a
Lemma 5.1 Assume that there is no weak Condorcet winner. If x 2 RN




for all i 2 N and if x is weakly Pareto optimal in V (N), then x 2 MB(N;V ).
Proof: If (S;y) is an objection at x, then jSj > n=2 and there exists ® 2 A such that uS(®) = y.
Choose ¯ 2 A such that ¯ Â ®. Then there exists T µ N, jTj > n=2 such that uT(¯) À uT(®).
Thus, (T;uT(¯)) is a counter objection. q.e.d.
Theorem 5.2 If jAj · 5, then MB(N;V ) 6= ;.
Proof: If jAj · 3, the proof that we gave for M (Theorem 4.1) works for MB, too. In order
to prove the theorem for m = 4 we may assume that there is no weak Condorcet winner. Then,
for each ® 2 A,
there exists i 2 N such that ® 2 ft3(Ri);t4(Ri)g: (5.1)
Indeed, if for some ® 2 A, ® 2 ft1(Ri);t2(Ri)g for all i 2 N, then ¯ Â ® implies that ¯ is a





By Lemma 5.1, x® 2 MB(N;V ), if x® is weakly Pareto optimal. Hence, in order to complete
the proof for m = 4, it suﬃces to show that there exists ® 2 A such that x® is weakly Pareto
optimal. Two possibilities may occur: If there exists ® 2 A such that ® 6= t4(Ri) for all i 2 N,
then, by (5.1), x® is weakly Pareto optimal. Otherwise, any x® is weakly Pareto optimal.
Now, let m = 5, let A = fa1;:::;a5g, and assume that MB(N;V ) = ;. Then, for each ® 2 A
(1) there exists ¯ 2 A such that ¯ Â ®;
(2) uN(®) is Pareto optimal (because MB is nonempty when we restrict our attention to the
game corresponding to the restriction of uN to A n f®g).
For ® 2 A denote `(®) = maxfk 2 f1;:::;5g j 9i 2 N : tk(Ri) = ®g. Let `min = min®2A `(®).
We distinguish cases:
9(i) `min ¸ 4: Then there exists a weakly Pareto optimal x 2 V (N) such that xi · ui(t4(Ri)) for
all i 2 N which is impossible by Lemma 5.1.
(ii) `min · 2: Let ®;¯ 2 A such that `(®) = `min and ¯ Â ®. Then ¯ is a Condorcet winner,
which is impossible by (1).
(iii) `min = 3: Let B = f¯ 2 A j `(¯) = 3g. If jBj = 3, then any ® 2 AnB violates (2). If jBj = 2,
let us say B = f®;¯g, then we may assume without loss of generality that ® 6Â ¯. Let ° 2 A
such that ° Â ¯. Then none of the remaining ± 2 A n (f°g [ B) dominates any of the elements
®;¯;°. By (1) we conclude that ° Â ¯ Â ® Â °. Then (minfui(®);ui(¯)g)i2N 2 MB(N;V ).
Now we turn to the case jBj = 1, let us say B = fa3g. Let b S = fi 2 N j t3(Ri) = a3g.
For any k 2 b S there exists xk 2 RN such that xk is weakly Pareto optimal, xk
k = uk(a3), and
xi
k · ui(t4(Ri)) for all i 2 N n fkg. As xk = 2 MB(N;V ), there exists a justiﬁed objection
(S;uS(®)) for some S µ N, jSj > n=2, and some ® 2 A. Let ¯ 2 A such that ¯ Â ®. Then
there exists T µ N, jTj > n=2, such that uS\T(¯) À uS\T(®) and uTnS(¯) ¸ (ui(t4(Ri)))i2TnS.
As (T;uT(¯)) is not a counter objection, we conclude that k 2 T, t4(Rk) = ¯, and t5(Rk) = ®.
We conclude that for any k 2 b S the alternative t5(Rk) is only dominated by t4(Rk). If n is odd,
we may now easily ﬁnish the proof by the observation that ® dominates all other alternatives
except ¯, and therefore (minfui(®);ui(¯)g)i2N 2 MB(N;V ). Hence we may assume from now
on that n is an even number. As a3 6Â ®, fi 2 N j ui(®) > ui(a3)g\fi 2 N j ui(¯) > ui(®)g 6= ;.
Thus, there exists j 2 b S such that t1(Rj) = ¯ and t2(Rj) = ®. So far we have for any k 2 b S,
where ® = t5(Rk);¯ = t4(Rk):
® is only dominated by ¯; (5.2)
There exists j 2 b S such that t1(Rj) = ¯;t2(Rj) = ®; (5.3)
jfi 2 N j ui(®) > ui(a3)gj ¸ n
2: (5.4)
Now, let k;j 2 b S have the foregoing properties, let us say k = 1 and j = 2. We also may assume
that t4(R1) = a4, t5(R1) = a5, t4(R2) = a1, t5(R2) = a2 (hence R2 = (a4;a5;a3;a1;a2)). So, for
any k 2 b S, we have
ft4(Rk);t5(Rk)g = fa4;a5g ) t4(Rk) = a4 (5.5)
t5(Rk) = a5 ) t4(Rk) = a4 (5.6)
ft4(Rk);t5(Rk)g = fa1;a2g ) t4(Rk) = a1 (5.7)
t5(Rk) = a2 ) t4(Rk) = a1 (5.8)
We are now going to show that there exists k 2 b S such that t5(Rk) = 2 fa5;a2g. Assume the
contrary. Then fi 2 N j ui(a5) > ui(a3)g \ fi 2 N j ui(a2) > ui(a3)g = ; and, by (5.4),
a5 6Â a3 and a2 6Â a3. Hence, by (1), a1 Â a3 or a4 Â a3. However, note that by our assumption
ui(a1) > ui(a3) implies ui(a1) > ui(a5) for all i 2 N. Thus, if a1 Â a3, then a1 Â a5 which
contradicts (5.2). Similarly, a4 Â a3 can be excluded.
10Hence, we may assume without loss of generality, that there exists k 2 b S such that t5(Rk) = a1.
We now claim that there exists j 2 b S such that t5(Rj) = a4. By (5.2) and the fact that a1 Â a2,
t4(Rk) 2 fa4;a5g. If t4(Rk) = a4, then by (5.3) there exists j 2 b S such that ft4(Rj);t5(Rj)g =
fa2;a5g. By (5.6), a5 6= t5(Rj), and by (5.8), a2 6= t5(Rj). Hence this possibility is ruled out.
We conclude that t4(Rk) = a5. By (5.3) there exists j 2 b S such that ft4(Rj);t5(Rj)g = fa2;a4g.
By (5.8), t5(Rj) = a4. So our claim has been shown.
So far we have deduced there exist kj 2 b S, j = 1;2;4;5, such that t5(Rkj) = aj. By (5.4),
jfi 2 N j ui(aj) > ui(a3)gj ¸ n
2 for all j = 1;2;4;5: We conclude that a3 = t3(Ri) for all i 2 N
and jfi 2 N j ui(aj) > ui(a3)gj = n
2 for all j = 1;2;4;5: Therefore a3 is not dominated by any
alternative, which contradicts (1). q.e.d.
We shall now present an example of a simple majority voting game on six alternatives whose
Mas-Colell bargaining set is empty.
Table 5.1: Preference Proﬁle leading to an empty MB
R1 R2 R3 R4
a1 a4 a3 a2
a2 a1 a4 a3
c c c b
b b b a4
a3 a2 a1 c
a4 a3 a2 a1
Example 5.3 Let n = 4, A = fa1;:::;a4;b;cg, and let RN 2 LN be given by Table 5.1. We
claim that MB(N;V ) = ;. Note that the proof below is similar to the proof of the emptiness of
an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a game derived from a 4-person voting problem
on ten alternatives (see Section 3 of Peleg and Sudh¨ olter (2005)).
Assume that there exists x 2 MB(N;V ). Let ® 2 A such that x · uN(®). Let
S1 = f1;2;3g;S2 = f1;2;4g;S3 = f1;3;4g;S4 = f2;3;4g:
We distinguish the following possibilities:
(1) x · uN(a1). In this case (S4;uS4(a4)) is an objection at x. As there must be a counter
objection to this, we conclude that (S3;uS3(a3)) is a counter objection, and therefore also
11an objection at x. Hence, x1 · u1(a3). To this objection, too, there must be a counter
objection. We conclude that (S2;uS2(a2)) is a counter objection. Hence, x2 · u2(a2) and
therefore x ¿ uN(b) and the desired contradiction has been obtained in this case.
(2) The possibilities x · uN(®) for ® 2 fa2;a3;a4g may be treated similarly.
(3) x · uN(b). Then (S1;uS1(c)) is an objection at x. There are several possibilities for a
counter objection to this. Each of them involves player 4 and one of the alternatives a1, a4,
or c. We conclude that, in any case, x4 · u4(a4). Hence, (S4;uS4(a4)) is an objection at x.
Now we conclude that (S3;uS3(a3)) must be a counter objection and, hence, an objection
at x. We continue by concluding that (S2;uS2(a2)) must be an objection and that, hence,
(S1;uS1(a1)) is a counter objection. Therefore, x ¿ uN(b) and the desired contradiction
has been obtained.
(4) x · uN(c). We consecutively deduce that (S4;uS4(a4));:::;(S1;uS1(a1)) are objections.
The desired contradiction again is obtained by the observation that x ¿ uN(b). q.e.d.
Example 5.3 may be generalized to any number m ¸ 6 of alternatives. Also, it may be generalized
to any even number n ¸ 4 of voters: if Ri = Ri for i = 1;:::;4; if
R5 = (a2;a1;c;b;a3;a4);R6 = (a4;a3;c;b;a1;a2);
if n = 4 + 2k for some k 2 N, if e RN 2 LN such that




k , if i = 5;6;
1 , if i = 1;2;3;4;
and if e V = VuN for some uN 2 U
e RN
, then MB(N; e V ) = ;.
6 The Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for an Odd Number of Voters
The examples that we just gave for emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set have an even
number of voters. The most natural setting for simple majority rule is when the number of voters
is odd. It is therefore desirable to study the existence question for MB in the class of simple
majority voting games with an odd number of voters. Attempts to construct small explicit
counterexamples, similar to those above, seem to fail. We take a diﬀerent approach, that leads
to the construction of a proﬁle of preferences with an odd number of voters, whose associated
simple majority voting game has an empty Mas-Colell bargaining set. This construction is
diﬃcult to visualize, and its presentation requires several preparatory steps. It also requires
huge numbers of voters and alternatives.
12Throughout this section we shall always assume that A is a ﬁnite set of m ¸ 2 alternatives and
that N = f1;:::;ng for some odd n 2 N. Recall that T = (A;Â) is a tournament on A if Â
is an irreﬂexive, asymmetric and complete relation on A (that is, ®;¯ 2 A;® 6= ¯ implies that
exactly one of ® Â ¯, ¯ Â ® holds).
The following lemmata and remarks are useful.
To put our ﬁrst lemma into context, we recall that McGarvey (1953) proved that every tour-
nament may be obtained as the domination relation Â RN of some proﬁle of preferences RN.
Our lemma strengthens this result by insisting that the contest between any two alternatives be
tight, i.e., decided by a one-vote diﬀerence.3
Lemma 6.1 For every tournament T = (A;Â) there exists a ﬁnite set N of voters and a
preference proﬁle RN 2 L(A)N such that n is odd and for all ®;¯ 2 A,




Proof: We proceed by induction on m = jAj. If m = 2, then Â is a linear preference and the
statement is true (with n = 1 and R1 = Â). If m > 2, then select ®0 2 A, deﬁne A0 = Anf®0g
and let Â0 be the restriction of Â to A0. By the inductive hypothesis there is a set N0 with an
odd number of elements and R
N0
0 2 L(A0)N0 such that





Let n = n0 + 2, B = f¯ 2 A0 j ®0 Â ¯g, and let R0 2 L(A0) such that, for all ® 2 B and all
¯ 2 A0 n B, ® R0 ¯. Put k0 = jA0 n Bj: Moreover, let R¤
0 be the reverse linear preference of
R0. Now, deﬁne Ri 2 L(A) for all i 2 N as follows (see Table 6.1). If i · n0+1
2 , then let Ri be
the linear preference that coincides with Ri
0 on A0 and ranks ®0 ﬁrst, that is, t1(Ri) = ®0 and
tk+1(Ri) = tk(Ri
0) for k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1. If n0+1
2 < i · n0, then let Ri be the linear preference
that coincides with Ri
0 on A0 and ranks ®0 last, that is, tk(Ri) = tk(Ri
0) for k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1
and tm(Ri) = ®0. Also, let Rn0+1 be the ordering that coincides with R0 on A0 and ranks ®0
last, that is, tk(Rn0+1) = tk(R0) for k = 1;:::;m ¡ 1 and tm(Rn0+1) = ®0. Finally, let Rn be
the ranking that coincides with R¤
0 on A0 and ranks ®0 between the elements of A0 nB and the
members of B, that is, ti(Rn) = ti(R¤
0) for i = 1;:::;k0, tk0+1(Rn) = ®0, and tj+1(Rn) = tj(R¤
0)
for j = k0 + 1;:::;m ¡ 1. The pair (N;RN) satisﬁes the desired properties. q.e.d.
Notation 6.2 Let (A;Â) be a tournament and ¯ 2 A. Denote
A+
Â(¯) = A+(¯) = f® 2 A j ¯ Â ®g; A¡
Â(¯) = A¡(¯) = f® 2 A j ® Â ¯g:
3Incidentally, the smallest number of voters n that is needed for McGarvey’s theorem (as a function of m) has
been studied in the literature. McGarvey’s original proof (which allowed also to prescribe ties between pairs of
alternatives) required n = m(m ¡ 1), and subsequent research (see Stearns (1959) and Erd˝ os and Moser (1964))
has shown that n = O(
m
log m) suﬃces and is the right order of magnitude. Our proof requires n = 2m ¡ 3.
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Our next lemma asserts the existence of tournaments in which every alternative beats exactly
half of the other alternatives, and it never happens that all the alternatives that beat a given
alternative are in turn beaten by (or equal to) another alternative.
Lemma 6.3 There exist inﬁnitely many positive integers m such that there exists a tournament
T = (A;Â) with jAj = m that satisﬁes the following properties:
jA+(®)j = jA¡(®)j = m¡1
2 for all ® 2 A: (6.2)
A¡(®) 6= A+(¯) for all ®;¯ 2 A: (6.3)
For all ® 2 A and ¯ 2 A¡(®) there exists ° 2 A¡(®) n f¯g such that ° Â ¯: (6.4)
Proof: The set Q = fp 2 N j p is a prime such that p ´ 3 mod 4g is inﬁnite. Let p 2 Q, p > 3.
Let Zp = f0;:::;p¡1g denote the ﬁeld of residue classes modulo p and let A = Zp. Let Â on A
be deﬁned by ® Â ¯ iﬀ ®;¯ 2 A and ®¡¯ is a quadratic residue modulo p (for the deﬁnition of
quadratic residues and their basic properties that we use below, see e.g. Chapter VI of Hardy
and Wright (1979)). It suﬃces to prove that (A;Â) satisﬁes the desired properties.
The fact that (A;Â) is a tournament that satisﬁes property (6.2) is an immediate consequence
of the following claim.
14Claim 1: The set of quadratic residues mod p contains exactly one element of every set ft;p¡tg
for every t 2 A n f0g.
Assume the contrary. As there are
p¡1
2 quadratic residues mod p, there exists t 2 A n f0g such
that t and p ¡ t are both quadratic residues. So, there are a;b 2 A such that a2 ´ t mod p and
b2 ´ ¡t mod p. Thus, a2 ´ ¡b2 mod p. Let c 2 A be the inverse of b, that is, bc ´ 1 mod p.
Then (ac)2 ´ ¡1 mod p. We conclude that (ac)p¡1 ´ (¡1)
p¡1
2 mod p. As p ´ 3 mod 4,
p¡1
2
is odd and, hence, (ac)p¡1 ´ ¡1 mod p. On the other hand, by Fermat’s theorem, (ac)p¡1 ´
1 mod p and the desired contradiction has been obtained.
The following claim enables us to show that (6.3) and (6.4) are satisﬁed.
Claim 2: The prime p divides the sum of all quadratic residues mod p.
If s denotes this sum, then since every quadratic residue is the square of two residues modulo
p, 2s ´
P











We conclude that 3s ´ 0 mod p. As p > 3, s ´ 0 mod p.
In order to show (6.3) we assume, on the contrary, that A¡(®) = A+(¯). By Claim 2,
X
°2A¡(®)
















° ´ 0 mod p:
By the assumption,
p¡1
2 (¯ ¡ ®) ´ 0 mod p, which is impossible.
In order to show (6.4) we assume, on the contrary, that there exists ¯ 2 A¡(®) such that ¯ Â °
for all ° 2 A¡(®) n f¯g: Hence, A¡(®) n f¯g = A+(¯) n f®g: Claim 2 yields
X
°2A¡(®)nf¯g
















° ´ (® ¡ ¯) mod p:
By the assumption,
p+1
2 (¯ ¡ ®) ´ 0 mod p, which is impossible. q.e.d.
For any set A of m alternatives let probA be the uniform probability measure on L(A), that is,
probA : 2L(A) ! R is deﬁned by probA(T) =
jTj
m! for all T µ L(A):
The next few lemmata and remarks establish some facts about the relative frequency of linear
preferences that display some desirable patterns. These facts are conveniently expressed in terms
of the uniform probability measure on L(A).
15Remark 6.4 Let ®;° 2 A, ® 6= °, and let Z µ A n f®;°g. Then




Indeed, we may assume that A = Z [ f®;°g. Let z = jZj. There are (m ¡ 1)! elements R of
L(A) such that tm(R) = ®. A similar statement is valid for °. We conclude that
jfR 2 L(A) j tm(R) 2 Zgj = m! ¡ 2(m ¡ 1)! = (m ¡ 2)(m ¡ 1)! = z(m ¡ 1)!
and, hence, (6.5) is true.
Lemma 6.5 Let t 2 Z such that t ¸ 0 and 2t+1 · m. Let ®;¯r;°r 2 A, r = 1;:::;t, be 2t+1
distinct elements and deﬁne for any r = 0;:::;t,
cr = probA(fR 2 L(A) j 9 k 2 f1;:::;rg such that ® R °k R ¯kg):








for all r = 1;:::;t: (6.6)
Proof: Clearly c0 = 0. Let r 2 f1;:::;tg: We may assume that m = 2r + 1. There are
2r¡1
2r (m ¡ 1)! preferences R 2 L(A) with the properties that t1(R) = ® and that °k R ¯k for
some k = 1;:::;r. Also, for every k = 1;:::;r, there are (m ¡ 1)cr¡1(m ¡ 2)! preferences
R 2 L(A) such that t1(R) = ¯k and ® R °` R ¯` for some ` 2 f1;:::;rgnfkg, because the rank
of °k is any element of 2;:::;m. The same number of preferences occurs, if °k is ranked ﬁrst.
We conclude that there are
dr =
2r ¡ 1
2r (m ¡ 1)! + 2rcr¡1(m ¡ 1)!
preferences R 2 L(A) such that ® R °k R ¯k for some k = f1;:::;rg. Equation (6.6) follows,
because cr = dr
m!. q.e.d.
Remark 6.6 Let c0 = 0. Successive computation of c1;:::;c6 via (6.6) yields that c6 > 1
2.
Lemma 6.7 For any tournament T = (A;Â) with m ¸ 453 that satisﬁes (6.2) – (6.4) the
following holds true: For every ® 2 A and every mapping h : A¡(®) ! A such that h(¯) Â ¯
for all ¯ 2 A¡(®),




Proof: Two cases may be distinguished.
Case 1: There exists ° 2 A such that jh¡1(°)j ¸ 23. By Lemma 6.3 there exists ¯ 2 A¡(®)
such that ° = 2 f¯;h(¯)g: Let Z = h¡1(°). Let
L1 = fR 2 L(A) j 9 ³ 2 Z such that ® R ° R ³g and L2 = fR 2 L(A) j ° R ® R h(¯) R ¯g:
16Then L1 \ L2 = ;. As Z µ A¡(®) and as ¯ 2 A¡(®), it suﬃces to show that probA(L1) +
probA(L2) > 1
2: Now, probA(L2) = 1

























where jZj ¸ 23 implies the weak inequality.
Case 2: For all ° 2 A, jh¡1(°)j · 22. In this case, we may choose pairwise distinct alternatives
¯1;°1;¯2;°2;:::;¯6;°6 so that ¯k 2 A¡(®) and °k = h(¯k) for k = 1;:::;6. Such a choice may
be achieved inductively, by selecting
¯k 2 A¡(®) n
k¡1 [
i=1
[f°ig [ h¡1(f¯i;°ig)] (6.8)
and letting °k = h(¯k). By the assumption of this case, the set appearing in square brackets in
(6.8) has at most 45 elements, and therefore the union in (6.8) has at most 225 elements. As we
are assuming that m ¸ 453, we have jA¡(®)j = m¡1
2 ¸ 226, and therefore the choice indicated
in (6.8) is feasible. Now, the probability in question is at least
probA(fR 2 L(A) j 9 k 2 f1;:::;6g such that ® R °k R ¯kg):
The proof is complete by Lemma 6.5 and Remark 6.6. q.e.d.
Now we are able to construct simple majority voting games with an odd number of players
whose Mas-Colell bargaining sets are empty. Let T = (A;Â) be a tournament with m ¸ 453
that satisﬁes (6.2) – (6.4). Lemma 6.3 guarantees the existence of T. Let N0, n0 odd, and
Q
N0
0 2 L(A)N0 be such that (6.1) is satisﬁed (for N = N0 and RN = Q
N0
0 ). Lemma 6.1
guarantees the existence of N0 and Q
N0
0 . Let N be obtained from N0 by adding k ¢ m! new
voters and let QN be obtained from Q
N0
0 by assigning each preference of L(A) to k of the new
voters. Note that (6.1) remains valid for RN = QN. Moreover, we assume that k is suﬃciently
large such that the following condition is satisﬁed. The empirical distribution of preferences
in QN is close enough to the uniform distribution so that the conclusion of Lemma 6.7 holds
true when probA is replaced by this empirical distribution, that is, by the probability measure
prob on L(A) that is determined by prob(fRg) =
jfi2NjR=Qigj
n for all R 2 L(A). Lemma 6.7
guarantees the existence of k.
In order to continue our construction, the following deﬁnitions and simple lemma are useful.
A vector ~ ® = (®i)i2N, ®i 2 A for all i 2 N, is a position. Let ~ ® be a position and ¯ 2 A. We
say that ~ ® enhances ¯ (at QN) if for every ° 2 A such that ° Â ¯ there exists i 2 N such that
®i Qi ° Qi ¯ and ®i 6= °. Note that the set of positions is partially ordered. Indeed, let ~ ® and
~ ¯ be positions. Then deﬁne ~ ® ¸ ~ ¯ iﬀ ®i Qi ¯i for all i 2 N. Note that if ~ ® ¸ ~ ¯ and ~ ¯ enhances
an alternative °, then ~ ® enhances ° as well.
17We call a position ~ ® non-enhancing (at QN) if it does not enhance any ¯ 2 A. If, in addition,
every position ~ ¯ ¸ ~ ®, ~ ¯ 6= ~ ®, enhances some ° 2 A, then we call ~ ® maximal non-enhancing
(MNE). Note that for any non-enhancing position ~ ® there exists an MNE position ~ ¯ such that
~ ¯ ¸ ~ ®.
Lemma 6.8 If ~ ® is a non-enhancing position and if ® 2 A, then jfi 2 N j ®i Qi ®gj < n
2:
Proof: Let S = fi 2 N j ®i Qi ®g and ¯ 2 A¡(®). As ~ ® does not enhance ¯ there exists
h(¯) 2 A such that h(¯) Â ¯ and, for all i 2 N, if ®i Qi h(¯) Qi ¯, then ®i = h(¯). As
h(¯) 6= ®, fi 2 N j ® Qi h(¯) Qi ¯g µ N n S. Therefore h : A¡(®) ! A is a function as in
Lemma 6.7 and fi 2 N j 9 ¯ 2 A¡(®) such that ® Qi h(¯) Qi ¯g µ N n S: By Lemma 6.7 and
construction, jN n Sj > n
2; and the proof is complete. q.e.d.
Construction (cont.): Let A¤ = f~ ®¤ j ~ ® is an MNE position of QNg be a set, whose cardinality
is the number of MNE positions, of alternatives such that A \ A¤ = ;. For every voter i 2 N
let Ri 2 L(A [ A¤) be a preference that arises from Qi by inserting every alternative in A¤ into
Qi in such a way that
~ ®¤ Ri ® , ®i Qi ® for all ® 2 A and all ~ ®¤ 2 A¤: (6.9)
In other words, the new alternative that corresponds to the position ~ ® is inserted just above ~ ®.
The internal order between new alternatives that are inserted in the same slot is immaterial.
Note that, by Lemma 6.8, in the tournament associated with RN, ÂRN (see Notation 2.1), every
® 2 A beats any ~ ®¤ 2 A¤, i.e.,
® ÂRN ~ ®¤ for all ® 2 A;~ ®¤ 2 A¤: (6.10)
We proceed to show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of the simple majority voting game
that corresponds to RN via some utility representation is empty. We ﬁrst present the idea of
the construction and proof verbally. In QN, the non-enhancing positions correspond to payoﬀ
vectors that admit no justiﬁed objection. In order to prevent those vectors from belonging
to MB, we added in RN new alternatives that render them non-weakly Pareto optimal. Of
course there is a danger that by doing this we introduce new candidates for belonging to MB.
Condition (6.10) is crucial for avoiding this, and in order to guarantee it we had to do the long
preparatory work.
Let uN 2 URN
and V = VuN.
Proposition 6.9 MB(N;V ) = ;.
Proof: Assume, on the contrary, that there is some x 2 MB(N;V ). Let y 2 RN be deﬁned by
yi = minfui(®) j ® 2 A[A¤;ui(®) ¸ xig for all i 2 N. Then y 2 MB(N;V ) as well. Moreover,
18there is a position ~ ® of RN such that yi = ui(®i) for all i 2 N. As y 2 MB(N;V ); the position
~ ® has the following properties:
9 ® 2 A [ A¤ such that ® Ri ®i 8 i 2 N: (6.11)
6 9 ¯ 2 A [ A¤ such that ¯ Ri ®i and ¯ 6= ®i 8 i 2 N: (6.12)
6 9 ¯ 2 A such that jfi 2 N j ¯ Ri ®i;¯ 6= ®igj > n
2 and ~ ® enhances ¯ at RN: (6.13)
Indeed, (6.11) and (6.12) are true, because y 2 V (N) and y is weakly Pareto optimal. In order
to show (6.13) let ¯ 2 A satisfy jSj > n
2, where S = fi 2 N j ¯ Ri ®i;¯ 6= ®ig: Then (S;uS(¯))
is an objection against y. Hence, there exist ° 2 A n f¯g and T µ N, jTj > n=2 such that
ui(°) ¸ maxfyi;ui(¯)g for all i 2 T (note that ° must be in A, rather than A¤, due to (6.10)).
By Lemma 6.1, T = fi 2 N j ° Ri ¯g and jTj = n+1
2 : Hence, ~ ® does not enhance ¯.
Claim 1: The position ~ ® does not enhance any ¯ 2 A.
In view of (6.13) we may assume that jfi 2 N j ®i Ri ¯gj > n
2: Let ® 2 A [ A¤ satisfy (6.11).
Then jfi 2 N j ® Ri ¯gj > n
2. Therefore, either ® = ¯ or ® ÂRN ¯. If ® = ¯, then ®i Ri ° Ri ¯
for some i 2 N implies that ®i = °. If ® ÂRN ¯, then ® 2 A by (6.10), and ®i Ri ® Ri ¯ for
some i 2 N implies ®i = ®. So, in both cases ~ ® does not enhance ¯.
Claim 2: There exists a position ~ ¯ satisfying ¯i 2 A and ¯i Ri ®i for all i 2 N such that ~ ¯
does not enhance any member of A (that is, ~ ¯ is non-enhancing at QN).
Let i 2 N and let ±i = t1(Qi) (that is, i’s best alternative in A). We show now that ±i Ri ®i.
Assume, on the contrary, ®i Ri ±i, ®i 6= ±i. Let °i be i’s lowest alternative in A, that is,
°i = tm(Qi). If ± 2 A [ A¤ satisﬁes ± ÂRN °i, then ± 2 A by (6.10). Moreover, ®i Ri ± Ri °i
and ®i 6= ±. Hence, ~ ® enhances °i and a contradiction to Claim 1 is established. Let ¯i be i’s
lowest alternative in A weakly above ®i, that is, ¯i 2 A, ¯i Ri ®i, and ¯0
i Ri ®i implies ¯0
i Qi ¯i
for all ¯0
i 2 A. By construction, since ~ ® does not enhance any ¯ 2 A, neither does ~ ¯. Claim 2
has been shown.
Select any MNE position ~ ¯ at QN that satisﬁes the conditions of Claim 2. By (6.9), ~ ¯¤ Ri ¯i and
~ ¯¤ 6= ¯i for all i 2 N. Combined with the fact that ¯i Ri ®i holds for all i 2 N this contradicts
(6.12). q.e.d.
7 Two Models with Many Voters
We present here two models, in which special assumptions about the distribution of preferences
in the population of voters lead to existence results when there are many voters.
The ﬁrst model is probabilistic. Let A be a ﬁxed set of m alternatives, and let L = L(A).
We assume that each R 2 L appears with positive probability pR > 0 in the population of
19potential voters, where
P
R2L pR = 1. Now let (Ri)i2N be a sequence of independent and
identically distributed random variables such that Pr(Ri = R) = pR for all i 2 N, R 2 L.
Let RN = (R1;:::;Rn) be the corresponding random proﬁle of preferences for n voters, and
let (N;V (RN)) be the random simple majority voting game that is associated via some utility
representation for each realization RN of RN.



















Proof: Call RN 2 LN good if for all ® 2 A there exists i 2 N such that ® = tm(Ri). If
RN is good, then 0 2 M(N;VuN) for any uN 2 URN
. Regarding MB(N;VuN) when RN is
good and uN 2 URN
, we distinguish two cases. If there is a weak Condorcet winner ®, then
uN(®) 2 MB(N;VuN). If no such ® exists, then 0 2 MB(N;VuN). Thus we see that in order to
prove both parts of the theorem, it suﬃces to show that RN is good with probability tending
to 1 as n tends to inﬁnity. This fact is easily checked. q.e.d.
The second model involves replication. Let A be a ﬁxed set of m alternatives, and let L = L(A).
Let N = f1;:::;ng, let RN 2 LN, and let uN 2 URN
. In order to replicate the simple majority
voting game (N;VuN), let k 2 N and denote
kN = f(j;i) j i 2 N; j = 1;:::;kg:
Furthermore, let R(j;i) = Ri and u(j;i) = ui for all i 2 N and j = 1;:::;k. Then (kN;VukN) is
the k-fold replication of (N;VuN).




n + 2 , if n is odd,
n




then MB(kN;VukN) 6= ;.
Proof: If ® is a weak Condorcet winner with respect to RN, then ukN(®)2MB(kN;VukN).
Hence we may assume that for every ® 2 A there exists ¯(®) 2 A such that ¯(®) ÂRN ®. Let
e x 2 RN
+ be any weakly Pareto optimal element in VuN(N). We deﬁne x 2 RkN by x(1;i) = e xi
and x(j;i) = 0 for all i 2 N and j = 2;:::;k and claim that x 2 MB(kN;VukN). Let (P;y)
be an objection at x. Then there exists ® 2 A such that y = uP(®). Let ¯ = ¯(®) and let






2 , if n is odd,
n
2 + 1 , if n is even:
(7.1)
Let Q = f(j;i) j i 2 T;j = 2;:::;kg and deﬁne z 2 RQ by z(j;i) = ui(¯) for all i 2 T and
j = 2;:::;k. Then jQj = (k ¡ 1)jTj and z > (yP\Q;xQnP): By (7.1), jQj ¸ kn+1
2 . So, (Q;z) is a
counter objection to (P;y). q.e.d.
20References
Aumann, R. J. (1967): “A survey of cooperative games without side payments”, in Shubik
(1967), pp. 3 – 27.
Aumann, R. J., and M. Maschler (1964): “The bargaining set for cooperative games”, in
Advances in Game Theory, ed. by M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker, vol. 52 of
Annals of Mathematical Studies, pp. 443 – 476, Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press.
Davis, M., and M. Maschler (1967): “Existence of stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations for coopera-
tive games”, in Shubik (1967), pp. 39 – 52.
Erd} os, P., and L. Moser (1964): “On the representation of directed graphs as unions of
orderings”, Magyar Tud. Akad. Mat. Kutat´ o Int. K¨ ozl., 9, 125 – 132.
Gaertner, W. (2001): Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Hardy, G. H., and E. M. Wright (1979): An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, 5th
edition. Oxford Science Publication, Oxford.
Mas-Colell, A. (1989): “An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set”, Journal of Mathemat-
ical Economics, 18, 129 – 139.
McGarvey, D. C. (1953): “A theorem on the construction of voting paradoxes”, Econometrica,
21, 608 – 610.
Peleg, B., and P. Sudh olter (2005): “On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining
set”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41, 1060 – 1068.
Shubik, M. (ed.) (1967): Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgen-
stern, Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press.
Stearns, R. E. (1959): “The voting problem”, The American Mathematical Monthly, 66, 761
– 763.
Vohra, R. (1991): “An existence theorem for a bargaining set”, Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 20, 19 – 34.
21